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Nonlocality and Bohr’s reply to EPR
N. David Mermin
Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-2501
Henry Stapp’s commentary (quant-ph/9711060) does not capture the
point I was trying to make in my essay (quant-ph/9711052) on how
a subtle flaw in his “proof of quantum nonlocality” clearly illustrates a
central issue in Bohr’s reply to EPR. I therefore wish to emphasize what
I do and do not say in that essay and even, with some trepidation, what
Bohr did and did not say in his reply to EPR.
In examining Henry Stapp’s reading (quant-ph/9711060) of my use (quant-ph/9711
052)1 of his beautiful but flawed nonlocality argument2 to elucidate Bohr’s reply to EPR, I
was strongly reminded of the importance of utmost caution in all questions of terminology
and dialectics.3 Several cautionary remarks are in order.
1. Stapp refers to “the nonlocal influence deduced by Bohr” [Abstract]4. He talks
about “the faster-than-light influence that [Bohr] claims exists” [p. 5] and the “action-
at-a-distance whose existence [Bohr] claimed” [p. 7]. Nowhere, however, do the terms
“nonlocal” or “faster-than-light” or “action-at-a-distance” appear in Bohr’s reply to EPR,
nor, so far as I know, can they be found in any of his subsequent writings. Such terms
hardly seem suited to characterize the influence that Bohr does identify: an influence on
the possibility of making valid predictions. The influence established by Stapp’s argument
has a similarly insubstantial character: it is an influence on the possibility of making
counterfactual statements that meet his own criterion for their valid use.
2. The statement Stapp says I grant [p. 1], under the condition that experiment L2
is performed on the left, differs significantly from my own translation of his modal-logical
symbolism into ordinary language. What I would accept is “(S): If performing R2 does
give +, then performing R1 instead would give –.” Stapp’s version uses “were to” instead
of “does”, and “must” instead of “would”, thereby blurring the crucial distinction between
what actually happened (performing R2 and getting the result +) and what might have
1 Note that on the second line of page 7 of my manuscript, R1− should (clearly) be
R1+.
2 Henry P. Stapp, “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” Am. J. Phys. 65, 300-304
(1997).
3 Neils Bohr, in Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, P. Schilpp ed., Open Court, La
Salle, Illinois, 1949, p. 237.
4 Bracketed references are all to Stapp’s quant-ph/9711060.
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happened but did not (performing R1). This distinction must be kept sharp because what
I do grant is that that the counterfactual part of the statement (which must, of course, be
clearly identifiable) meets Stapp’s criterion under the stated condition.
3. When a statement about what would have happened in an unperformed experiment
fails to meet Stapp’s criterion it is not “false” [p. 1] — it is meaningless, be it ever so “well-
formed” [p. 6]. When I insist that such a counterfactual has no meaning in the context of
Stapp’s argument I am not “capriciously” adopted a “rule” or engaging in an “evasion of
logic” or “arbitrarily limiting the scope of logical reasoning” [p. 7]. I am merely noting that
the statement fails to meet Stapp’s own rule for when a counterfactual can make sense.
4. The question I raise is not whether “LOC2 fails” [p. 1]. My point is that Stapp uses
his locality principle LOC2 in a case where the conditions for its application have not been
met. The essential ambiguity responsible for the gap in Stapp’s argument lies not in LOC2
but in the statement (S) to which Stapp wishes to apply LOC2. The counterfactual part
of (S), which apparently refers only to past events (which is essential for the applicability
of LOC2), actually makes implicit reference to future events, through Stapp’s criterion for
the validity of a counterfactual statement. This implicit future reference does not make
LOC2 fail ; it renders LOC2 inapplicable.
5. I do indeed understand, and Stapp’s original argument makes it quite clear, that
his use of LOC2 is designed precisely to circumvent the fact that the direct proof of (S)
requires the experiment L2 to be performed [p. 2]. My point is not that he overlooks the
importance of L2 being performed. It is that his stratagem for getting around its non-
performance with the help of LOC2 fails, because — and this is what he does overlook —
LOC2 is then inapplicable, for the reason noted in 4 above.
6. If “truth of” were replaced by “possibility of making sense of” then I would agree
that “the issue . . . is whether a nontrivial dependence of the truth of (S) upon a future free
choice means that there is some sort of backwards-in-time influence” [p. 2]. In addressing
that issue I would maintain that because the influence is only on the possibility of satisfying
Stapp’s criterion for the valid use of counterfactuals, it is inappropriately characterized as
“backwards-in-time”, or “faster-than-light”, or “nonlocal”.
7. An appealing feature of Stapp’s original argument was that it eschewed all incau-
tious talk of such problematic notions as “Nature’s choices”, “Nature’s earlier selections”,
or even “properties”. Such terminology reappears in his commentary [pp. 2,3]. If these
notions are essential to his argument, this raises other issues and, it seems to me, makes
that argument less interesting. If (as I suspect) he has reintroduced them only to provide
a more intuitive feel for the kind of “nonlocality” he claims to have derived, then they have
no relevance to my point, which concerns the internal coherence of his original argument.
8. Stapp correctly notes that I question “whether the fact that statement (S) refers
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explicitly only to possible measurements and possible results confined to the right-hand
region R really justifies” Stapp’s crucial step [p. 5]. But I do so not from an excessive
preoccupation with his original proof of (S), but because the absence of an explicit ref-
erence to the left does not preclude the presence of an implicit reference, as noted in 4
above. To give (S) meaning Stapp’s criterion requires the actual performance on the left
of an experiment whose result makes it possible to deduce from the result of the actual
experiment on the right, what the result would have been for the experiment on the right
that was not actually performed.
9. The reason I get “involved in questions of definitions and meanings” [p. 5] is that
Stapp himself gives a clear criterion for when a counterfactual can have meaning in a
physical argument, and because the meaning of a counterfactual statement is central in
the step in his argument that I examine. As I read Bohr, he too was broadly interested
in questions of definition and meaning. Their appearance in his reply to EPR is similar to
their appearance in my discussion of Stapp’s nonlocality argument. As I note toward the
end of my essay, Stapp’s crucial counterfactual and EPR’s crucial prediction-with-certainty
play interestingly similar roles, except for a reversal of the time order of the relevant events.
As a result of this exchange of predictions and counterfactuals, Stapp’s argument provides
a more transparent illustration of what I (but not Stapp) believe to be the nature of Bohr’s
reply to EPR.
10. Lucien Hardy and John Bell before him fatally undermine the position of EPR.
But they make surprisingly little difference to the internal coherence of Bohr’s side of the
exchange. Whether Bohr knew in his bones that there were no elements of reality or
knew it through backwards-in-time messages from Bell and Hardy, has no bearing on what
he criticizes in EPR’s reasoning. I agree that “the Hardy-based analysis fortifies Bohr’s
position” [p. 7, Abstract], but only because it makes one take seriously the urgent need to
find a flaw in the apparently cogent reasoning of EPR. This is why the flaw that invalidates
Stapp’s ingenious attempt to derive nonlocality — the alternative EPR’s reasoning leads
to if elements of reality are excluded (as they themselves remark) — can be so similar,
even after Bell and Hardy, to the one Bohr identified over sixty years ago.
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